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Abstract
We present a framework that allows to certify the fairness degree of a model based
on an interactive and privacy-preserving test. The framework verifies any trained
model, regardless of its training process and architecture. Thus, it allows us to
evaluate any deep learning model on multiple fairness definitions empirically. We
tackle two scenarios, where either the test data is privately available only to the
tester or is publicly known in advance, even to the model creator. We investigate
the soundness of the proposed approach using theoretical analysis and present
statistical guarantees for the interactive test. Finally, we provide a cryptographic
technique to automate fairness testing and certified inference with only black-box
access to the model at hand while hiding the participants’ sensitive data.
1 Introduction
Machine learning systems are increasingly being used to inform and influence decisions about peo-
ple, leading to algorithmic outcomes that have powerful personal and societal consequences. For
instance, decisions such as (i) is an individual likely to commit another crime? [2]; or (ii) is an
individual likely to default on a loan? [31] are made using algorithmic predictions. This can be
concerning given the many documented cases of models amplifying bias and discrimination from
the training data [6, 21, 8, 29]. To address this formally, a line of recent works [10, 14, 18, 20]
considers fairness in classification by proposing notions of fairness based on similarity measures
and formalizing variants of this notion that provide guarantees against discrimination.
One common scenario in which such a discrimination could potentially happen is a setting with a
client and a server. The server classifies queries by a client in an automated way using a machine
learning model generated by it. On the other hand, the client wants to make sure its queries are
treated fairly and its sensitive data is conserved. If the model itself is not a secret, then a client can
potentially run tests (such as the ones implied by the references above) on the model to establish its
purported fairness without exposing its data. Making a model public, however, is not always in the
interest of the server, since it has invested resources such as expertise, data and computation time for
the training – and therefore often wants the model to remain proprietary. Moreover, sharing models
may in some cases raise security or privacy concerns. It therefore may be deemed appropriate or
necessary to outsource any such test to a semi-trusted third party such as a government entity, which
would inspect a model and certify its fairness. This raises our first question:
Question 1: Can we design a framework for certifying the fairness of models, giving guarantees to
clients while being practically realizable and keeping the model secret from the clients?
Having such a third party relieves the client from testing fairness, but actually just shifts responsibil-
ity to someone who might be more qualified to make a judgement about the model. To minimize the
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necessary trust between the model owner and the third party, such a test would still be restricted to a
black-box scenario. In addition, constructing such a test for establishing fairness guarantees can be
difficult on its own. Given that the sources and amount of data is limited, it might be that the third
party can only use data in the fairness test that the model owner is familiar with. This might enable
the model owner to design an unfair model which successfully passes the examination by the third
party. This raises our second question:
Question 2: Can we design a black-box fairness test that gives guarantees even if the test set is
(partially) known?
Here, by a black-box test we mean that a test should only query the model M on different inputs but
should not make any assumptions about the actual model parameters.
Our contributions In this work, we answer both questions affirmatively. We design an architec-
ture for three (or more) participants which are the model owner (or “server”) S, the client C and a
trusted third party R (also called “regulator”). Our architecture uses techniques from cryptography
to construct secure protocols for
1. An interactive test between S and R allowing to establish with probability that a model M
provided by S is fair with respect to a set of pre-defined groups. While ensuring that R does
not learn M . This test considers scenarios where S is or is not aware of the test data. R is not
involved in the training of M , it only performs certification.
2. An interactive computation between S and C which computes a prediction yˆ = M(x) from an
input x and a model M . The interactive computation neither leaks M to C nor x to S, and yet
makes sure that the model that was used in the prediction has been certified byR.
Our work provides fairness tests necessary for these protocols that have black-box to the model
and uses existing highly efficient cryptographic primitives to implement the tests securely. While
we motivate the underlying ideas of these tests on an intuitive level and give formal arguments
for their soundness, we also provide experimental evidence that the hypotheses that make our tests
possible are viable. Since secure and privacy-preserving computation of models, for both training
and inference, is a very active research area (e.g. [27, 16, 28, 24]), the performance of the current
solutions in this field is continuously improving. As our work assumes the existence of secure
protocols for inference, and investigates how to add fairness on top of these in a generic way that is
independent of the underlying training algorithm, our approach will benefit in practicality from any
independent progress that is made in this direction.
Related work Fairness in algorithms was first investigated by Friedman and Nissenbaum [12].
Since then, further research into data as a source of unfairness in ML decisions has been done e.g.
in [17, 7]. Baluta et al. [4] showed how to verify properties of a DNN (fairness among them). In
their work they encode the network into Conjunctive Normal Forms and then test if it will likely
fulfill certain logical constraints. In comparison, our approach is independent of the concrete model
parameters and architecture.
Recently, Kilbertus et al. [19] suggested to use cryptographic primatives for fairness certification,
fair model training, and model decision verification. However, this work was mainly focused on
model training, and did not provide analysis and guarantees for model fairness certification and
verification. In contrast, our study focuses on fairness certification of existing models, which we
analyze from a theoretical and practical point of view while providing guarantees based on the
number of samples available in the test set. We also explore a different scenario where these samples
are known to S during model training, which makes the certification harder.
Several statistical measures of unfairness, and fairness criteria are studied in [11, 32]. These and
subsequent works achieve statistical notions of fairness through post-processing the training data,
and/or by enforcing constraints at training time. Our work differs from this line of research in
that we want to guarantee fairness which is enforced obliviously of the training process. Dwork et
al. [10] shows that statistical notions of fairness are inadequate, while [8] established that calibration
does not rule out unfair decisions. These results emphasize that fairness is nuanced, complicated,
application-specific, and can depend on legal and social contexts. In this work, we answer the
orthogonal question of designing a fairness test for a model, given an accepted definition of fairness.
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2 Preliminaries
Let X be the set of possible inputs, G be a finite set of groups that are relevant for fairness (e.g.,
ethnic groups) and Y be a finite set of labels. We suppose X × G × Y is drawn from a probability
space Ω with an unknown distribution D. Let M be a trained model for a classification task of D,
we denote M(x) for classification of input x ∈ X .
The goal of training a model M is usually to achieve low error on unseen data. In addition, when
dealing with model fairness, we also take into account a measurement with respect to G. While
there are plenty of fairness measurements [30], here we focus on group risk and likelihood based
definitions, specifically: overall risk equality, equalized odds and demographic parity. First, we
define the conditional risk and likelihood respectively:
`g(M) = E
(x,g′,y′)∼D
[1 {M(x) 6= y′} |g′ = g] (Risk)
`g,y(M) = E
(x,g′,y′)∼D
[1 {M(x) 6= y′} |g′ = g, y′ = y] (Risk with label condition)
Lg,y(M) = E
(x,g′,y′)∼D
[1 {M(x) = y} |g′ = g] (Likelihood)
where 1{pi} is an indicator function with a predicate pi. The empirical conditional risk is defined for
a given independent sample set T = {(x1, g1, y1), ..., (xm, gmym)} ∼ Dm as:
¯`
g(M,T ) =
1
mg
m∑
i=1
1{M(xi) 6= yi ∧ gi = g} (1)
where mg is the number of samples in T from group g.
We define a metric called the fairness gap to be the maximal margin between any two groups (and
labels). Formally, we use three well-known measurements:
max
g0,g1∈G
|`g0(M)− `g1(M)| (Overall Risk Equality)
max
g0,g1∈G,y∈Y
|`g0,y(M)− `g1,y(M)| (Equalized Odds)
max
g0,g1∈G,y∈Y
|Lg0,y(M)− Lg1,y(M)| (Demographic Parity)
Likewise, the empirical fairness gap (EFG) is defined using the empirical approximation of each
measurement respectively.
Lastly, we consider a model M as -fair on (G,D) with respect to a fairness measurement if its fair-
ness gap is smaller than . We relax the definition by demanding to have -fairness with confidence
1 − δ, which in practice is inherent due to the limited sample set from D. That is, a model M as
-fair on (G,D) under the overall risk equality metric if:
Pr
[
max
g0,g1∈G
|`g0(M)− `g1(M)| > 
]
≤ δ (2)
Similarly, plugging-in the fairness gap metric for equalized odds and demographic parity yields the
corresponding -fairness definition of each of them.
3 The Framework
In Section 1 we gave an overview about the different participants in our setting. In this section we
will make their roles more explicit and describe the security guarantees that are given to each of them
as well as the trust relations. Note that we discuss our framework with respect to three participants
but it can easily be generalized to any larger number. In particular, it allows for a large number of
regulators {Ri}ki=1 that a client C can choose from or even perform the regulators role by itself.
• The Server S initially generates the model M . Its main objective is to keep M secret.
• The Client C has a private input x and wishes to obtain yˆ ← M(x), where the server provides
M (depending on the application, S might receive yˆ as well but not x). The objective of C is to
ensure that M is fair while keeping x private.
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• The third participant is the Regulator R who should neither learn M nor x or y. After S proves
the fairness of model M ,R outputs certificate certM for the model to attest its validity. certM
is tied to another certificate R issued, certID, which serves as the identity of R. Thus, when
certM is shown to C it can verify that indeed R certified the model using certID. In addition,
R has access to the sample set T in order to check fairness, which is possibly known to S.
The certificates certID, certM are implemented using a digital signature scheme and a collision-
resistant hash function. Roughly, certID is a public verification key that is tied to the identity ofR,
and certM is a signature on a compressed version of the model that is computed using a collision-
resistant hash function. Here, a cryptographic signature ensures that only R could issue certM ,
while the hash function forces S to use the same model with C that he used when obtaining certM .
We define signature schemes and collision resistant hashing in Appendix A.
S
C
R
1. Send certification data certID
1. Send certi-
fication data
certID
2. Verify fairness of modelM
3. Certify fairness as certM
5. Classify accord-
ing to modelM ′
4. Check if
M ′ is certified
by certID
and certM
Figure 1: Certification and Verification
At the beginning of the protocol, R generates
its public certificate certID and makes it avail-
able. S and R then interact to generate the
model certificate certM for model M . In the
process R is allowed to query M an arbitrary
number of times to ensure fairness. To perform
an inference by S and C, both first agree on a
regulator certificate certID that they will use.
Then, C obtains an output yˆ based on its input
x and on a model M ′ provided by S. Here, C
only accepts yˆ ifM ′ is certified by the regulator
behind certID for fairness. C does not learn
anything about M ′, besides yˆ. Fig. 1 describes
the aforementioned process schematically.
Both the inference onM and the verification of certM that are necessary in Fig. 1 can be done using
secure computation. Secure Computation lets parties perform computations that reveal neither their
inputs nor any intermediate values, but only the outputs of the computation. This can be done easily
if S,R and C would have access to a “trusted third party”FSC which performs the computational task
for them. That trusted third party would receive inputs from participants, do the computation, and
send the output back to them. In our case, FSC would recieve all secret input from the participants
and send certM to S after verifyingM is fair. FSC can also sendM(x) to C if modelM ′ is certified
in that manner.
Such a ”trusted third party” does not exist, however one can imitate it using secure computation. We
provide more information on how to emulateFSC in Appendix A.3, together with the aforementioned
process and its security in Appendix B.
4 Certifying Fairness Interactively
We introduce two interactive tests which allowR to determine if a model M is -fair:
1. The model M is queried using a sample set T which is unknown to S. We show that fairness
guarantees about M can be made given by the empirical fairness gap (EFG) and a lower-bound
on the minimal size of the set T with respect to each group g ∈ G.
2. The model M is queried using a sample set T˜ which is derived from a set T in an augmented and
randomized fashion (namely, by making small changes to items from T ). The set T as well as
the augmentation algorithm are known to S in advance. We show that this test implies -fairness
of M , given that the augmentation impacts fair and unfair models in a different way.
Both of the aforementioned tests are independent of the representation of M , make no requirement
on its training algorithm and only require access to M(·) for different inputs. Looking ahead, this is
precisely what allows us to perform those tests interactively between S andR without leaking M .
4.1 Certifying Fairness using Private Data
We start by describing the first test when the model M is queried using a sample set T which
is unknown to S. All definitions below are based on -fairness with confidence 1 − δ under the
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overall risk equality fairness metric, however these can be modified to other group-based fairness
definitions.
Given a sufficient amount of unknown samples from every group g ∈ G, we approximate the con-
ditional risk of the model M as in (1). In order to achieve a high confidence in the test and a close
enough approximation, R needs to generate enough samples from each group, i.e. a balanced test
set T w.r.t G. This is inherent, as we cannot make claims about the behavior of M with respect to g
without ever probing M on elements in g.
Denote the Empirical Fairness Gap as EFG = maxg0,g1∈G |¯`g0(M,T )− ¯`g1(M,T )|. The follow-
ing theorem states the conditions which guarantee that a model is -fair with a confidence 1− δ.
Theorem 1. A model M is -fair with confidence 1− δ if:
EFG <  and min
g∈G
mg ≥ 2
(− EFG)2 ln
2|G||Y|
δ
(3)
for T = {(x1, g1, y1), ..., (xm, gm, ym)} ∼ Dm and where mg , as in Eq. (1), denotes the number
of occurrences of g in T .
Demographic parity and equalized odds can be achieved by using the corresponding EFG definition
and minimizing over G × Y , counting mg and mg,y respectively in (3). The full proof of the above
theorem can be found in Appendix C.1, and it relies on an Hoeffding-bound argument.
In other terms, we require the EFG of the model to be smaller than , and the difference between
 and the EFG has an impact on the minimum number of samples we require from each group to
guarantee -fairness. We can see a natural trade-off in Theorem 1: A larger sample set is required to
verify smaller fairness gaps, as indicated by . Thus the more data you have, the easier it is to verify
that the EFG is close to the actual fairness gap.
4.2 Certifying Fairness using Augmented Data
The disadvantage of the aforementioned test is that all test data T must be hidden so that the model
generator S cannot use it to adaptM accordingly. In other settings, we would like to test for fairness
using public data, which can be known to S. This setting is realistic in many scenarios. For example,
if labelled data is costly, getting unique labelled data for a test will be difficult forR.
A straightforward argument against this approach is once the data is publicly available, T is not cho-
sen independently of M . Thus, a malicious S can create an unfair model that memorizes the set T
and responds fairly on it, so that it passes the test outlined above. To counter such dishonest training,
we need a method to alter the existing samples and force some sort of generalization abilities. We
therefore define the notion of an augmentor. An augmentor applies random augmentations to the
input which alter the sample but still preserves its label and group with high probability, here we
use it to generate new samples for querying that with high probability were not seen during model
training. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition in order to ensure a valid test for M . For
example, consider an augmentor that only alters the first few pixels of the image. A model that
simply ignores those pixels can still overfit on the rest of the image and pass any test.
Hence, in this work we suggest to use a set of randomized augmentation functions to reduce memo-
rization capabilities of an adversary. For this, the assumption is that -fair models behave differently
from unfair models when queried against the samples augmented by the augmentor. Then, this dif-
ferent behavior can be leveraged to expose the unfair nature of certain models. Our approach follows
this assumption to construct a querying test set in the same fashion of the test from Section 4.1.
More specifically, define an algorithm augmentor aug : X ×G×{0, 1}τ → X ×G that gets as input
a random string and a sample and outputs a new augmented sample. The label and group of the new
sample should be the same as the original sample with high probability.
We re-define the conditional risk to be on an augmented sample from D. Formally:
`g,aug(M) = E
(x,g′,y)∼D,r←{0,1}τ
[
1{M(x˜) 6= y}
∣∣∣(x˜, g˜) = aug(x, g; r) ∧ g′ = g˜].
As mentioned before, there is no guarantee that samples augmented by aug yield better results
than T itself. We need an additional assumption on the behavior of fair and unfair models when
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shown augmented samples from aug, thus we call a class of modelsM detectable if it fulfills that
assumption.
Definition 1 ((, α, aug)−detectable fairness). Let A be an arbitrary training algorithm which out-
puts a model inM. M has (, α, aug)-detectable fairness on D if there exists m ∈ N such that for
any T ∼ Dm and M ∼ A(D, T, aug, α), M is -fair if:
max
g0,g1∈G
|`g0,aug(M)− `g1,aug(M)| ≤ α .
Definition 1 allows us to build an interactive test and to empirically find parameters , α,m and an
augmentor for which it appears to be true. It also yields a non-trivial angle both for breaking our
overall construction and for improving it. Notice, the above definition does not imply that all -fair
models have this property, and some fair models will not be discovered due to that. In Section 5.2
we demonstrate that some models seems to be detectable. Additionally, we observe that the output
of aug is not required to be indistinguishable from a new sample fromD. In particular the definition
does not rule out that A is aware of the possible augmentations.
Let T˜ be a sample set T after augmenting each sample. Denote ¯`g,aug(M, T˜ ) the empirical condi-
tional risk and EFG = maxg0,g1∈G
∣∣∣¯`g0,aug(M, T˜ )− ¯`g1,aug(M, T˜ )∣∣∣. We state the following,
Theorem 2. Let M be a class of models with (, α, aug)-detectable fairness. Let T, T˜ , aug and
M ∈M be as stated above. M is -fair with confidence 1− δ if:
EFG < α and min
g∈G
mg ≥ 2
(α− EFG)2 ln
2|G||Y|
δ
.
In other words, we can certify -fairness of a model with high confidence assuming (, α, aug)-
detectable fairness. The proof of this theorem is in Appendix C.2.
5 Experiments
We provide empirical evidence to demonstrate that the assumptions made for the fairness tests in
Section 4 are meaningful.
We used six different datasets from various domains: visual (UTKFaces [33], LFW [15], Colored-
MNIST [3], and a subset of CelebA1 [26]), tabular (Adult Income [22]) and spoken (TIMIT [13]).
The datasets vary in size and disparity of minority groups and as such some can be used to create
fair or unfair models based on their empirical fairness gap (EFG). We demonstrate the variety of our
datasets and detail the preprocess in Appendix D.1.
5.1 Private Data Setup
Simulating the necessary setup for Section 4.1, we assume that R possesses a subset of secret sam-
ples to be used to certify a model M for fairness and accuracy. Naturally, we split the data into a
training and test subset. Setting -fair and δ-confidence thresholds, we can certify whether a model
is fair using the conditions in Theorem 1. A bottleneck of these conditions is our dependency on the
size of the sample set. Datasets with bigger sample set allow us to certify more (fair) models, while
we were not able to certify a (fair) model if the sample set was too small, even if it is indeed truly
fair under the chosen fairness metric.
We performed our test on the mentioned datasets with δ = 0.05 and varying  of 0.05, 0.075 and
0.1. For some tasks this gap and confidence level might be intolerable, but for others, such as gender
prediction of a face image, which is the task set for UTKFace, LFW and CelebA, it is better than the
existing empirical gaps between ethnicity groups of well-known service providers’ models [6].
The test results for overall risk equality are shown in Fig. 2. As shown, out of the six datasets only
C-MNIST and CelebA produced fair models during our training for  = 0.05, while UTKFace has
a fair model for  = 0.075. LFW, Adult Income and TIMIT datasets are all below the threshold of
all tests, either due to sample size or a large EFG. Therefore, we focus on the first three datasets as
they are the only ones to pass any of our tests.
1We annotated 8,500 celebrities out of 10,177 in the dataset for ethnicity using Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Three turkers annotated three images of each of the 8,500 celebrities, resulting in 177,683 images classified as
either Asian, African, Caucasian or Other. The annotations can be downloaded from https://github.com/
will/be/published/.
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Table 1: Fairness test in the private and public settings on the 3 image datasets. ”Regular” refers to the model
trained fairly, while ”Bias” refers to the biased sampled training.
Dataset Model
Private Setting Public Setting
Accuracy Risk Equality EFG Accuracy Risk Equality EFG
Regular Bias Regular Bias Regular Bias Regular Bias
UTKFace ResNet18 89.76 88.56 0.012 0.093 96.11 91.44 0.027 0.139
C-MNIST LeNet 98.11 74.01 0.001 0.450 89.17 67.97 0.007 0.340
CelebA ResNet18 97.63 96.95 0.007 0.034 96.60 97.02 0.010 0.033
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
Empirical Fairness Gap
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Figure 2: Private fairness test borders by EFG and the minimal
mg . Left to the dashed border is the area where a model would
pass the test for that  with δ = 0.05. Dots indicate the overall risk
equality results for each dataset.
To further evaluate the setup, we
trained the same models with a
tainted batch sampler. The sampler
showed less samples from the small-
est minority group-label pair (g1, y1)
in each batch in order to generate a
synthetic sample disparity. We de-
noted these models as Bias in Fig.
2 and Table 1. The taint resulted in
an almost as accurate model with a
much larger EFG, suggesting they are
less fair. For equalized odds, only
CelebA had enough samples to cer-
tify a model for  = 0.05. It re-
quires at least twice as many sam-
ples (since we count mg,y instead of
mg). We find it interesting as it im-
plies the amount of data should be a
consideration even for which defini-
tion of fairness is practical to choose.
We detail the results for equalized
odds and demographic parity metrics
in Appendix D.2. Results for bias C-MNIST does not appear in Fig 2 since its performance is
significantly worse.
5.2 Augmented Public Data Setup
In this setup, all the data used in the test is known to all participants. With that in mind, we show
a potential augmentor for datasets of images and demonstrate empirically that unfair models cannot
pass our test as both accurate and fair. Even though the training set is the same as the test set, the key
difference is that S fixesM before we apply our augmentor to the dataset with new randomness. This
generates diverse enough samples, for which models that are fair and generalize well on augmented
samples pass the test, while models which are either unfair or bad at generalization fail the test.
Our augmentations include rotation, cropping, blanked pixels [34] and added Gaussian noise. Each
augmentation was set to be invoked at a certain probability threshold which was chosen randomly.
The augmented images should keep the same label and group as the original image to the human
eye. By doing so, we hope to generate varied data that cannot be easily be reversed or overfitted on.
We tested our three image datasets using the overall risk equality metric, the results are in Table 1.
We used the same method to generate fair and unfair models as in Section 5.1 with the following
difference: during training we invoked the augmentor per sample to generate a new augmented
sample each time. When we trained the models on the original dataset, the models were not able to
generalize on the augmented data.
The results show that there exists a margin in EFG between the fair and unfair models on UTKFace,
C-MNIST and CelebA, while the margin is different between datasets, potentially due to their vary-
ing size and different complexities of the tasks. This suggests the existence of some α per dataset,
based on Definition 1, but we were not able to pinpoint the exact α. We conducted further attempts
to characterize α in Appendix D.5.
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Figure 3: (a)-(b) 1-NN attack accuracy and EFG; (c) ODIN out-of-distribution rate.
Attacks against public fairness tests As we assume that our test works without knowledge of
the concrete model, our scheme might be susceptible to an indirect attack on our augmentor. For
example, if the model could distinguish between the public data available and a new sample, it could
try and behave fairly during the test, but unfairly when an actual new sample is shown. To mimic
such an attack, we tested on UTKFace whether it is easy to fool our test using a simple k-nearest
neighbour algorithm (kNN) or an out-of-distribution detection technique (ODIN [25]) on top of a
fair classifier to identify the augmented samples. For a fixed threshold distance from our augmented
dataset, we would switch to the unfair model and otherwise output the class of identified by the
kNN. For the ODIN attack we would create a threshold for detect out of distribution samples to
switch to the unfair classifier. Ideally these attacks uses the kNN or fair classifier to pass the test
as fair when needed, while future new samples (being “far enough” in threshold terms) invoke the
unfair model as predictor. We gave the kNN augmented samples of the test as referenced neighbors
and plotted the accuracy and EFG by the threshold distance for k=1 in Fig. 3a-b (larger k had worse
results). In order to have a similar EFG the fair model have, this approach leads to a drop in accuracy
from 91.44% to 81.9%. In the other attack, we tuned ODIN’s hyperparameters, taking the values
which had at least 95% success rate identifying test samples and had the best results at detecting
new samples as out-of-distribution. Further details on tuning are listed in Appendix D.4. We plotted
the train and test detection rate as out-of-distribution by threshold in Fig. 3c. As can be seen, the
sets are detected at similar rates, and are nearly indistinguishable. This resulted in a similar fair or
unfair behavior depending on the chosen threshold. These experiments suggest that these types of
attacks are not a good approach to attack our proposed test, as this hybrid models cannot pass as
both fair and accurate enough for practical applications.
6 Discussion & Future Work
We present an interactive test to certify fairness of any machine learning model using cryptographic
methods such as secure computation. The interactive test ensures R does not learn M , x does not
leak to S, and M does not leak to C, yet it verifies the model was used during inference has been
certified by R. We experimented with two scenarios where the test data is either public or private.
We provide analysis and guarantees for the test data, as well as rigorously define the relation between
the empirical fairness gap to the sample set sizes.
We believe creating regulatory entities, such as our abstract entityR, can be a step towards standard-
izing fairness. Once these roles are set in place, our framework can guarantee users are treated fairly
in a secure manner. Moreover, from our guarantees and experiments we noticed not all fairness
definitions are created equally, some are harder to verify and require a much larger volumes of data,
i.e. equalized odds requires at least twice as many samples as overall risk equality. This makes room
for consideration on what practical definition should we aim for with respect to limited resources or
what compromise needs to be made in terms of fairness gap and certainty ( and δ).
For future work we would like to further explore the public data scenario. Specifically, to character-
ize the detectable fairness hyper-parameter α and its relation to other parameters like the sample set
size T , the amount of randomness used per augmentation, etc. Additionally, we would like to ex-
plore whether these parameters can be estimated in advance, without having to conduct experiments
on a dataset. Our results in Section 5 suggest that this is a challenge on its own. Moreover, as we are
dealing with large models we also require to hash the model inside secure computation. This step
has substantial cost (see Appendix B.4), and it is an open question if it could be made more efficient
in practice using different ideas than ours. Lastly, the proposed method is focused on group-based
fairness definitions, exploring other fairness definitions is also an interesting research direction.
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Broader Impact
Our framework touches two important and sensitive subjects: fairness and privacy. As such, it has
tremendous value from an ethical perspective, but also should be treated with careful consideration
as a formal notion of fairness does not always align with what we think is fair and just. We be-
lieve our work is a step in the larger context of looking at Machine Learning problems through a
cryptographic lens. This opens up the prospect of benefiting from what cryptography has to offer –
balancing integrity with privacy.
The benefit of our framework is that it is a method to certify and evaluate fairness under a formal
definition thereof, while it also conserves the privacy of clients and the intellectual property of model
providers. Clients and providers benefit from it as it bridges the potential mistrust between them. It
can also standardize fairness in the form of trusted regulators which are acknowledged as trustworthy
in evaluating models. We find this to be an aspect that hopefully has a positive impact on society.
However, we need to be careful by what we consider as fair. There is no ”one size fits all” fairness
definition which complicates the validity of a certification in social terms. In particular, we focused
on specific notions of fairness in our work, as these lead to an implementable result. The question
of which fairness notion is the most applicable in a certain setting is independent of it and beyond
the scope of this work. Our work leaves the definition of fairness to policy makers, regulators and
other experts, and gives a way to take an accepted definition of fairness and certify a model for it. It
should also be noted though that we guarantee fairness only up to certain probability, and this might
give people a false sense of fairness of a model even when there’s a chance it is not.
What is interesting about our work is that issues like fairness and transparency are considered to
be at odds with another desirable feature – privacy. But our work brings these together. Moreover,
cryptographic models for various primitives and protocols ranging from encryption to secure com-
putation are designed to work in worst-case adversarial environments. This seems to be necessary
for successful deployment of machine learning in certain applications and we hope that bringing this
mindset to the machine learning field might be beneficial.
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A Cryptographic Primitives
We now describe the cryptographic primitives that are necessary to implement our framework from
Section 3 in more detail: Signatures, Collision-Resistant Hash Functions and Secure Computation.
A.1 Signatures
Cryptographic signatures can be thought of as a computational analogue to hand-written signatures.
We give a schematic explanation of signature schemes in Figure 4. Here, a pair of a public verifi-
cation key vk and a secret signing key sk are generated together by the key generation algorithm
KeyGen. sk will be used by the signing algorithm Sign to create a signature σ on a message m,
while the verification algorithm Verify decides if a pair (m,σ) is valid according to the verifica-
tion key vk or not. Secure signature schemes guarantee unforgeability, which means that given vk
and arbitrarily many signature pairs {(mi, σi)}i∈[`], it is hard to generate a valid signature σ on a
message m, where m 6= mi for all i ∈ [`].
A.2 Collision-Resistant Hashing
We will use a Collision-Resistant Hash Function Hk : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n, which is an
efficiently computable function such that it is hard for any polynomial-time algorithm (in n) that is
given a random k to come up with x1, x2 such that Hk(x1) = Hk(x2). In practice, one uses e.g.
SHA-3 to implement Hk for a k that is fixed in advance. Since the input length of SHA-3 is fixed,
in order to hash longer messages, one can apply Hk recursively using a Merkle Tree (see Figure 4).
For such a Merkle Tree it can be proven that if Hk is collision-resistant then Hˆk is too.
Sign
Verify
KeyGen
m
sk
vk
σ 0/1
Ĥk(m1, . . . ,m`)
m1 m2 m3 m4 m`−1 m`
. . . . .
.
Hk(·)
Hk(·) Hk(·) Hk(·)
Hk(·)
. . .
. . .
Figure 4: Signatures (left), Merkle Trees (right)
A.3 Secure Computation
We further let parties perform computations on shared data such that the computation does not reveal
their inputs, for purposes as mentioned in Section 3.
Secure Computation can be imagined as the existence of a “trusted third party” FSC which performs
a computational task for certain parties. FSC would receive the inputs from both participants, do the
computation, and send the output to the participants. The task of this party is outlined in Figure 5:
As is common in the secure computation literature, this description assumes that the computation is
done by a circuit K. Participant P1 provides to the trusted party its input x1, while participant P2
provides its input x2. The trusted party computes K(x1, x2) and sends its outputs to the respective
participants. By this definition this “idealized box” FSC achieves the desired privacy objective.
Such a trusted third party FSC as described in Figure 5 does not necessarily exist in the real world,
but it can be emulated using cryptographic tools as a protocol consisting of two (or more) entities
sending messages to each other over a network. Guarantees in these protocols can be given if at least
one of the participants is acting honestly throughout the process.
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Two parties P1,P2 can talk to this trusted third party.
Input: Upon message (Input−P1, x1) from P1 and (Input−P2, x2) from P2 store x1, x2 locally.
Compute: Upon input (Compute,K) from P1 and P2 and if x1, x2 have been stored:
1. Check if x1, x2 have suitable size for the circuit K. If not, output (Abort).
2. If x1, x2 have suitable size then compute (y1, y2) = K(x1, x2) and store y1, y2 locally.
Output: Upon input (Output) from P1 and P2 and if y1, y2 have been computed, send y1 to P1 and
y2 to P2.
Figure 5: A Trusted Third Party FSC for Secure Computation.
The two most popular approaches for implementing Figure 5 are based on cryptographic paradigms
called Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) and Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC). For com-
parison, current FHE schemes are constrained by their demand for computational power and they at
best can evaluate a few hundred AND-gates of the circuit K per second. MPC on the other hand,
which has a higher demand in terms of communication, can achieve a much better throughput. In
particular, there exist MPC schemes that are tailored at efficiently implementing the function M(·),
such as e.g. [5, 9].
B Implementing the Framework
In this section we describe how to implement the framework from Section 3 using the tests from
Section 4. While the implementation is described at a high level, it is easy to instantiate each of the
components based on existing cryptographic tools and the experimental results from Section 5.
B.1 Creating the Test
Consider a design of an interactive test based on the set T = {(x1, g1, y1), ..., (xm, gm, ym) and
parameters δ,  as follows:
1. The regulatorR computes the minimal mg fulfilling Equation (3) by assuming EFG = 0.
If T does not contain enough samples from each group, thenR aborts. IfR does not abort,
it tells S the total number of inputs m that will be checked.
2. R and S run a secure computation of a functionality FCheck which is described below. S
inputsM intoFCheck whileR inputs ({(xi, gi, yi)}i∈[m]). The functionalityFCheck consists
of the following steps:
(a) Compute yˆi ←M(xi) for all i ∈ [m].
(b) For all i ∈ [m], compute a bit bi as 1 if yˆi = yi and 0 otherwise.
(c) Based on the bi values, compute for each group g the empirical risk ¯`g(M,T ) based
on Eq. 1.
(d) Based on the result of the previous step, evaluate Eq. (3) of Theorem 1 (checking
-fairness). Output 1 if the statement holds and 0 otherwise.
Based on the statement of Theorem 1 it follows that FCheck will output 1 if and only if the model M
provided by S is -fair with confidence 1− δ.
The secure computation of FCheck implements the functionality as a Binary circuit K that is evalu-
ated on secret inputs. We examine the size of this circuit in Section B.4.
A test using augmented data If R instead wishes to use public and augmented data as for The-
orem 2 then this will only work assuming that M is (, α)-detectable as defined in Definition 1. In
such a setting R would now create a test set T ′ from T locally using an augmentor aug and then
follow the exact same path as for the public data (albeit with different constants).
B.2 Algorithms
We now describe how to use the circuitK from Section B.1 to implement the framework. The overall
approach is as follows: Initially,R generates a signature key pair and distributes the verification key
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to all other participants. ThenR and S run a secure computation which runs the test of Section B.1
and computes a Merkle tree hash Hˆk(M) of the modelM . If the test finds that the model is fair, then
R signs (Hˆk(M), , δ, fairness definition string) and sends the signature to S. By signing , δ and a
fairness definition string we allow multiple fairness definitions and hyperparameters to be certified.
Later, whenever S and C run a certified inference for , δ and a fairness definition, then in addition to
running a secure computation of M(x), the functionality will also recompute the hash Hˆk(·) of the
model provided by S and output it to C, while S sends the signature on the model to C. C can then
locally check ifR originally issued the signature on the hash for those hyperparameters and fairness
definition, given the public verification key ofR. The overall protocols are outlined in Figure 6.
We will have three participants S, C,R as outlined before. Let (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) be a signature
scheme and Hk(·) be a collision-resistant hash function whose key k is a common input to all parties.
Moreover, let FSC be a functionality for secure computation as outlined in Figure 5. S has a model M
as input, R has a fairness validation set T as well as parameters , δ and fair the fairness definition
string.
Setup: This reflects Step 1 of Figure 1.
1. R uses KeyGen to generate a key pair (sk, vk). R keeps sk private and sends vk to
C,S as certID .
Certification: This reflects Steps 2, 3 of Figure 1.
1. S,R input the same values into FCheck as they do in Section B.1.
2. Let K be the circuit as outlined in Section B.1. Create a circuit Kcert that performs the
following:
First run K on the respective inputs as before, computing FCheck. Denote the output bit
of this circuit as b. Then compute the Merkle tree output h ← Hˆk(M) based on the
hash function Hk. Finally, output (b, h) toR.
3. Both parties run a secure computation of Kcert using FSC.
4. If the output bit b is 1, then R computes σ(h) ← Signsk(h, (, δ, fair)) and sends it
as certM to S.
Inference: This reflects Steps 4, 5 of Figure 1.
1. S sends σ to C. C also knows the signature verification key vk.
2. S and C run a secure computation, where S inputs M˜ and C inputs its input x. For this
secure computation they construct a circuit Kinf as follows:
(a) Compute yˆ ← M˜(x).
(b) Compute h˜← Hˆk(M˜).
3. C,S run a secure computation of Kinf using FSC. C obtains as output (yˆ, h˜) while S
does not obtain anything.
4. C computes b ← Verifyvk(σ˜, (h˜, , δ, fair)). If this is true then C accepts yˆ. Other-
wise it rejects it.
Figure 6: Protocol piFramework for Certified Inference
B.3 Security
We now give a sketch of the argument about the security of piFramework with respect to Section 3. This
must naturally stay on a high level, since we did not make the security properties of the framework
formal.
First, we note that piFramework leaks toR and C the Merkle-tree hash h of the model. But since it can
be assumed thatM has high entropy and the implementation ofHk is a cryptographic hash function,
the leakage of h should be tolerable.2 That being said, we base our security argument on statements
2It is possible in principle to reduce this leakage by computing R’s signature of h, and the signature veri-
fication by C, in a secure computation, but this will considerably increase the overhead. In the other direction,
if we are willing to leak some more information then the circuit K can be modified to output toR whether M
successfully classified each input xi and let R compute the -fairness of the model locally. This will simplify
the secure computation at the cost of leaking more data toR.
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about the security of the building blocks that are used, which can be instantiated using well-known
cryptographic constructions:
• The functionalityFSC can be implemented using a secure protocol. As mentioned in Section
2 this can be done using secure two-party or multi-party computation (MPC).
• There exist secure signature and hashing schemes.
Given these primitives, we can assume that the certification and inference steps of Figure 6 are as
secure as if they were computed by a trusted party: Assume that in the inference step, the signature
σ˜ and output h˜ of FSC are validated. This can only happen due to 3 cases: (i) σ˜ was generated for M˜
byR (which is the desired course of events); (ii) σ˜ was issued byR but for a different M˜ ′; or (iii) σ˜
was never issued byR. In the last case, S must have broken the security of the signature scheme. In
the second case, S must have broken the collision-resistance of Hk. Therefore, either S managed to
break the signature scheme or the hash function, or R signed M˜ . R computes this signature if and
only if the model passed the test of Section B.1. Based on the statement of Theorem 1 it follows that
this test passes if and only if the model M˜ provided by S is -fair with confidence 1− δ.
B.4 Efficiency
We now estimate the efficiency of implementing our framework using piFramework. We first claim that
it only makes sense to run our framework in settings where the ML inference is done using a secure
computation: If the inference is not computed using a secure computation, then one option is for the
client to learn the model and run by itself a check for fairness, or send the model to another party
and ask it to do this check. Another option is that the client simply hands over its input to the model
owner, but this would require prohibitively expensive zero-knowledge proofs, to be computed at the
owner side, to attest to fairness of the output without revealing anything about the model.
Therefore, given that inference is done via secure computation, the parties must incur the cost of run-
ning a secure computation of the inference, and the efficiency of the framework should be measured
by the additional overhead that is added on top of the secure inference.
The main computational tasks that are run by piFramework are as follows:
• The Certification phase runs m instances of a secure computation of inference and in
addition computes a hash of the model and checks the accuracy of the output.
• The Inference phase runs a single secure computation of the inference and in addition
computes a hash of the model.
The Certification phase is a one-time event, and therefore its overhead is less critical. Theorem 1
shows that the number of samples mg per group should be m = 2(EFG−)2 ln
2|G|
δ2 . Setting for
exampleEFG = 0.05,  = 0.1, δ = 0.2 and considering |G| = 100 groups, we get thatmg ≈ 6800,
which does not seem to be too far off from existing training set sizes.
In more detail, we describe here the cost of implementing the different steps of the circuit K which
computes the certification, as described in Section B.1: Step (a) needs to implement the inference m
times. This is by far the largest component of the circuit. Step (b) computes m comparisons, which
are easy. Step (c) computes ¯`g(M,T ) for each group g, based on Eq. 1. This computation must sum
the b values for each group g. To make this step efficient, the circuit must hard-wire the connections
for these summations, and the locations of the inputs from each g can be known. (There is no need to
hide these locations from S.) Eq. 1 also computes a division by mg , but there is no need to compute
the division and the circuit forwards mg · ¯`g(M,T ) to the next step. Step (d) tests Eq. 3 for each pair
of g0, g1, namely computes ¯`g0(M,T )− ¯`g1(M,T ). Since the input to this step is mgi · ¯`gi(M,T )
then the test in this equation should be changed appropriately (which is straightforward, especially
if mg0 = mg1 ).
As for the cost of computing M(·), current secure computation implementations for this task only
hide the weights of a DNN but reveal the actual network structure and activation functions. We
assume that our secure computation will also only hide the weights as this seems to be a standard
assumption. Therefore, we ask what is the additional cost of hashing this data over the default cost
of using the weights in the computation of the model.
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There is a lot of current work on lightweight hashing schemes for usage in zero-knowledge proofs,
and it is reasonable to expect that a lot of improvements in this area will be made in the near future.
As a baseline, we consider the Keccak-F function, which is the basis of the SHA3 standard. That
function takes a 1600 bit input and can be implemented by a Boolean circuit of 38,400 AND gates
(see [1]), i.e. 24 AND gates per input bit. If we use a Merkle tree then the total number of hashes is
twice the number of input blocks3. Therefore, the total cost is about 48 AND gates per input bit.
Now, with regards to the secure evaluation of the model (not considering special MPC implemen-
tations for secure inference4), let us consider a setting where the weights have 32 bit fixed-point
values. The cost per each weight (when used in DNN inference) must be at least that of multiplying
the weight with either an input or output of a hidden layer and adding all these products together
(neglecting the cost of the activation function). Multiplying the weight with a 32 bit value costs 185
ANDs per input bit, while adding up the result would only require 6 ANDs per input bit (see [1]), and
we therefore take the assumption that the total cost of the secure computation is 191 AND gates per
bit of the weights (neglecting the activation function). Therefore the fairness verification increases
the cost of inference in this model by only about 25%. While using optimized implementations for
inference will make the additional overhead from hashing larger, we can in practice lower the cost
of hashing drastically by exploiting special properties of FSC which allow the use of homomorphic
commitments. We leave such specialized hashing techniques as interesting future work.
C Theorems Proofs
C.1 Theorem 1
Using Hoeffding’s concentration bound we get that:
Pr
[∣∣¯`
g(M,T )− `g(M)
∣∣ > − EFG
2
]
≤ 2e−mg (−EFG)
2
2 =
δ
|G||Y|
By a union bound it follows that |¯`g(M,T )−`g(M)| ≤ (− EFG)/2 for all g ∈ G with probability
1− δ. Given that this event holds then, by applying the triangle inequality twice, for any g0, g1 ∈ G
we have:
|`g0(M)− `g1(M)| ≤ |`g0(M)− ¯`g0(M,T )|+ EFG+ |¯`g1(M,T )− `g1(M)| ≤ 
Hence maxg0,g1∈G |`g0(M)−`g1(M)| ≤ with confidence 1−δ. Similar arguments show the same
is true for equalized odds and demographic parity.
C.2 Theorem 2
Similar to the proof in C.1, we get that:
Pr
[∣∣∣¯`g,aug(M, T˜ )− `g,aug(M)∣∣∣ > α− EFG
2
]
≤ δ|G||Y|
which implies that |`g0,aug(M) − `g1,aug(M)| ≤ α with confidence 1 − δ for all groups. SinceM
is (, α)-detectable fairness, then M is -fair with the same confidence.
D Experiments Details
D.1 Datasets
• UTKFace [33] is a dataset of face images with attribute annotation for age, ethnicity (called
race and annotated as black, asian, white or other), and gender (male or female). We
3We can improve on that by having the circuit output to C the results of the first layer of the Merkle tree,
and have C locally compute the rest of the tree. For this to work, we will on the other hand have to add random
values to each input block to avoid lookup table-based attacks on preimages of Hk.
4This analysis neglects recent works such as e.g. [5] that apply to special types of networks only. We believe
that the accuracy of the networks such as MobileNets that are used in [5] is too low to be of use for fairness
testing.
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focused on gender prediction as a task across two ethnicity groups black and white and
discarded all other samples, so we were left with 14,604 samples, which we split equally to
train and test sets. The dataset consists of 70% white and 30% black, 53% male and 47%
female.
• MNIST is originally a dataset of hand-written digits from 0 to 9. The dataset is used to pre-
dict the digit in the image without additional annotations, hence there are 10 classes across
the dataset without any allocation of groups. We changed the task to a binary classification
and synthetically generated two fairness groups of digits based on MNIST data. Therefore,
we assign the label 0 to the digits 0-4 and the label 1 to the digits 5-9. We randomly colored
half of the dataset’s digits in red as was done in [3], resulting in 50% red digits and 50%
white digits – these were the fairness groups. We called this dataset C(olored)-MNIST.
• LFW [15] is a dataset of face images with attributes annotation [23]. Using the “Black”
attribute we divided the data into two groups, while using “Male” as a binary label.
• CelebA [26] is a face recognition dataset consisting of more than 10,000 different celebri-
ties with gender labelling. We annotated 8,500 celebrities out of 10,177 in the dataset
for ethnicity using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Three turks annotated three images of each
of the 8,500 celebrities, resulting in 177,683 images classified as either Asian, African,
Caucasian or Other5. During our experiments we merged all but the Caucasian group to
produce a large dataset to showcase our setup, having over 30,000 samples for the minority
group.
• Adult Income [22] is a tabular features dataset with a label for low/high income. We used
the gender feature as group affiliation and income for labels. During the preprocessing all
numeric features were normalized, while categorical features were transformed into one-
hot vectors in order to be used later by DNN models.
• TIMIT [13] is a voice recognition dataset with dialects and gender annotation. We used
the different dialects as groups and gender of speaker as label. To have more samples
per dialect, we merged dialects which have much in common and are considered similar,
namely we merge New England with New York City and Northern with North Midland,
while discarding the rest.
Dataset Size g0, y0 g0, y1 g1, y0 g1, y1
UTKFace 14,604 37.5% 31.51% 15.87% 15.12%
LFW 13,144 74.22% 21.52% 3.24% 1.02%
CelebA 177,683 33.97% 49.26% 8.67% 8.11%
C-MNIST 70,000 25% 25% 25% 25%
Adult Income 48,842 46.54% 20.3% 29.52% 3.62%
Table 2: Data distribution across groups and labels for each of the datasets.
D.2 Private Data Setup Full Results
Full results for overall risk equality, equalized odds and demographic parity can be found in Table
3.
D.3 Public Data Setup Full Results
We’ve experimented with cutting the UTKFace dataset in half, to see how it affects the margin and
α. We also have results for the LFW dataset. Since we could not generate a fair model in LFW,
we have no reference or evidence of margin, but empirically the EFG seems high suggesting the
augmentation would work on it as well. Results are in Table 4.
D.4 ODIN Tuning
We tuned ODIN’s 3 hyperparameters - T temperature,  perturbation and δ threshold. We chose
T from among {1, 10, 100, 1000},  from 30 evenly spaced numbers between 0 and 0.01 and took
5The annotations can be downloaded from https://github/will/be/published/
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Dataset Model Accuracy Risk Equality Equalized Odds Demographic Parity
EFG -Test EFG -Test EFG -Test
UTKFace ResNet18 89.76 0.012 Failed† 0.067 Failed 0.007 Failed†
UTKFace Bias-ResNet18 88.56 0.093 Failed 0.115 Failed 0.088 Failed
CelebA ResNet18 97.63 0.007 Passed 0.017 Passed 0.083 Failed
CelebA Bias-ResNet18 96.95 0.034 Failed 0.045 Failed 0.039 Failed
C-MNIST LeNet 98.11 0.001 Passed 0.022 Failed† 0.001 Passed
C-MNIST Bias-LeNet 74.01 0.450 Failed 0.485 Failed 0.464 Failed
LFW ResNet18 91.06 0.049 Failed† 0.398 Failed 0.065 Failed
Adult Income MLP 84.17 0.108 Failed 0.377 Failed 0.182 Failed
TIMIT LeNet 89.07 0.040 Failed† 0.117 Failed 0.082 Failed
Table 3: Fairness test using private data with  = 0.05 and δ = 0.05. “Failed†” refers to insufficient
sample size to certify the fairness of the model.
Dataset Model Accuracy Risk Equality EFGFair Bias Fair Bias
UTKFace - Half Size ResNet18 92.13 87.03 3.56 12.91
UTKFace ResNet18 96.11 91.44 2.72 13.88
C-MNIST LeNet 89.17 67.97 0.65 34.04
LFW ResNet18 91.98 - 7.45 -
CelebA ResNet18 96.60 97.02 1.01 3.28
Table 4: Fairness test using public data with an augmentor on the 4 image datasets. ”Half Size”
refers to the dataset with half of the samples removed.
those which yielded the best results for any δ ∈ [0, 1]. We note that the hyperparameter tuning had
little effect, as most of the values chosen performed very similarly.
D.5 Testing with unknown margin
In certain scenarios it might be hard to determine α necessary for the fairness test in advance. For
example, UTKFace in the augmented public data setup has a different fairness gap than the one
seen when private data is used, and the fairness gap is influenced by the sample set size. To further
investigate the nature of our augmentation under the assumption that the gap is unknown, we tested
the models under an increasingly larger degree of augmentation (frequency that each augmentation
is invoked) for each sample. The changes in accuracy and fairness gap are presented in Table 5. The
accuracy decreases as we increase the augmentation degree, which fits the idea that it might be hard
to generalize on the augmented data. Hence, more augmentation yields less accuracy. The fairness
gap, on the other hand, had inconclusive results: increasing the augmentation degree had little or no
effect on CelebA dataset, while it greatly varied on UTKFace between fair and unfair models.
Augmentation Dataset Fair Model Unfair Model
Degree Acc. Risk-Eq EFG Acc. Risk-Eq EFG
25% UTKFace 97.08 3.56 91.74 18.51
50% UTKFace 94.58 2.03 91.14 15.4
75% UTKFace 91.74 3.15 88.16 13.36
25% CelebA 97.24 1.03 96.99 4.82
50% CelebA 95.84 0.84 96.08 4.33
75% CelebA 93.84 0.79 94.67 4.42
Table 5: Accuracy and overall risk equality EFG for different degrees of augmentation
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